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272 GANTNER v. GANTNER [39 C.2d 
[So F. No. 18573. In Bank. July 11, 1952.] 
NEILMA BAILLIEU GANTNER, Respondent, V. 
VALLEJO GANTNER, Appellant. 
[1] Divorce-Custody of Children-Modification of Award-Dis-
cretion.-Trial court has broad discretion in matters pertain-
ing to change of custody of children of divorced parents, 
and its decision will not be reversed by an appellate court 
unless the record clearly shows an abuse of that discretion. 
[2] ld.-Custody of Children-Modi1l.cation of Award-Evidence. 
-Trial court's determination on hearing of divorced husband's 
motion for modification of custody provisions of decree that 
it is to the best interests of the children to remain with their 
mother is sustained by testimony that the children were , 
mentally and physically healthy, that the relationship between 
them and their mother was one of love and companionship, and 
that they received proper care and attention. 
[3] ld.-Custody of Children-Modi1l.cation of Award-Preference 
of Children.-It is proper to deny request of divorced husband, 
seeking modification of custody provisions of decree, that 
court ask children of parties which parent they preferred, 
where the children, who were aged 11 and 9, .did not appear 
to the court to be of sufficient age to form an intelligent 
preference for one parent over the other (Civ. Code, § 138(1», 
and where such question would thus have had little if any 
probative value and would have served only to subject the 
children to serious emotional disturbance. 
[4] ld.-Custody of Children-Modi1l.cation of Award-Circum-
stances Justifying.-Wbile trial court has continuing juris-
diction to modify custody provisions of a divorce decree (Civ. 
Code, § 138), to justify a modification there must be a change 
of circumstances arising after the original decree is entered, 
or at least a showing that the facts were unknown to the 
party urging them at the time of the prior order and could 
not with due diligence have been ascertained. 
[6] ld.-Custody of Children-Modification of Award-Evidence. 
-In determining whether circumstances have changed to 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1944 Rev.), Divorce andSepara-
tion, § 140.4; Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 684. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Divorce, §287(4); [2,5-7,10] Di-
vorce, § 287 (6); [3,4] Divorce, § 287; [8] Appeal and Error, § 889; 
[9] Trial, §380; [11] Trial, §25; [12] Divorce, §286, [13,14] 
Appeal and Error, § 1230; [15] Evidence, § 273; [16] Appeal and 
Error, § 1230(3). 
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warrant modification of the custody provisions of a divorce 
decree, the court necessarily considers the facts established 
in the former proceeding as a basis for comparison. 
[6] ld.-Custody of Children--ModiAcation of Award-Evidence. 
-Evidence of wife's conduct preceding entry of interlocutory 
divorce decree is properly rejected as nonresponsive to the 
issues in proceeding to modify custody provisions of decree. 
[7] ld.-Custody of Children-ModiAcation of Award-Evidence. 
-Modification of divorce decree so that children of parties 
could live with father only during parts of Christmas holidays 
and school vacations and he could visit them only on Sundays 
"from breakfast time to bed time" is sustained by father's 
testimony that children were emotionally disturbed by being 
shifted from one home to the other on weekends, and by 
mother's testimony that they were disrespectful to her after 
visiting their father. 
[8] Appeal-Briefs-Facts Outside Record.-Statements of coun-
sel in briefs are not part of the record on appeal, and may 
not be relied on to show alleged bias and prejudice of the 
trial judge where no affidavits were filed to support such 
statements and the alleged misconduct does not appear on the 
face of the record. 
[9] Trial-Findings-Opinion of Judge as Impeaching Findings.-
It is proper to refuse to admit in evidence the memorandum 
opinion of the trial judge in a prior proceeding where the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are admitted, since 
the findings supersed~ such opinion. 
[10] Divorce-Custody of Children-ModiAcation of Award-Evi-
dence.-On hearing of a divorced husband's motion for modi-
fication of custody provisions of decree, it is proper to refuse 
to allow him to ask a witness whether he had a good infiuence 
on the children where his former wife conceded that his 
relation with the children was one of love and devotion. 
[11] Trial-Conduct of Judge.-A. trial judge is not a mere 
passive spectator at the trial, and within reasonable limits 
it is not only his right but his duty clearly to bring out the 
facts so that important functions of his office may be fairly 
and justly performed. 
[12] Divorce-Custody of Children-Removal of Children from 
JuriBdiction.-Trial court may permit divorced mother having 
custody of children of parties to remove them to a foreign 
country if it concludes that best interests of children would 
he promoted by such removal, either permanently or tem-
porarily, and if its decision is supported by sufficient evidence. 
[12] 'Order in divorce or separation proceeding concerning re-
moval of child from jurisdiction, note, 154 A.L.R. 552. 
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[13] Appeal-Rule Under Code Civ. Proc., § 956a.-Purpose of 
Code Civ. Proc., § 956a, providing that appellate courts may 
take additional evidence of facts occurring prior to decision 
of appeal and may give or direct entry of any judgment or 
order as the case may require, is to permit an appellate court 
to remedy defects in the record to the end that the judgment 
or order appealed from may be affirmed and further litigation 
terminated. 
[14] ld.-Rule Under Code Civ. Proc., § 956a.-Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 956a, was not intended to convert appellate tribunals into 
triers of facts, and may not be invoked by a divorced mother 
having custody of children of parties to have a reviewing 
court enter an order permitting her to remove the children 
to a foreign country where this question was never decided by 
the trial court and there are no findings of fact on that issue. i 
[15] Evidence--Xearsay-Evidence at Former Trial.-Where trial 
on issue of taking children of divorced parents to a foreign 
country for a vacation trip has not been completed, but only 
suspended by appeal from order denying modification of the 
divorce decree, use of evidence at the former hearing does not 
come within rule that evidence at a former trial is usually 
inadmissible at a second trial. 
U6] Appeal-Rule Under Code Civ. Proc., § 956a-Taking Evi-
dence.-Motion requesting Supreme Court to take additional 
evidence under Code Civ. Proc., § 956a, to support affirmance of 
order denying modification of final decree, will be denied 
where there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the 
findings and the order of the trial court. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the City 
and County of San Francisco denying motion to modify 
custody provisions of divorce judgment. Herbert C. Kaufman, 
Judge. Affirmed; motions to make a special order and to take 
additional evidence under Code Civ. Proc., § 956a, denied. 
Morris Lowenthal and Juliet Lowenthal for Appellant. 
Young, Rabinowitz & Chouteau, Harry S. Young and John 
E. Anderton for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Neilma and Vallejo Gantner were mar-
ried in 1941. Two children were born of the marriage, 
Vallejo and Carillo, now aged 11 and 9. On August 9, 1949, 
the trial court entered an interlocutory decree granting Neilma 
a divorce and awarding Nailma and Vallejo joint legal cus-
tody of the children. Neilma was given physical custody of 
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the children subject to Vallejo's right to visit them and to 
havc them with him several weekends each month. Neither 
party appealeu. The final divorce decree contained the same 
custody provisions as the interlocutory decree. 
On April 17, 1951, Vallejo filed a notice of motion re-
questing that the custody provisions be modified to give him 
physical custody of the children. The motion was heard 
before the same judge who had heard the divorce action. 
The court found that it was in the best interests of the 
children for them to remain in Neilma's custody and denied 
the motion. It also modified the decree, limiting Vallejo's 
right to have the children with him and his right to visita-
tion. The present appeal followed. 
[1] Vallejo contends that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in refusing to transfer custody to him. The trial 
court has broad discretion in such matters, and its decision 
will not be reversed or modified by an appellate court unless 
the record clearly shows an abuse of that discretion. (Prouty 
v. Prouty, 16 Ca1.2d 190, 191 [105 P.2d 295]; Foster v. 
Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719, 730 [68 P.2d 719]; cases collected in 
9 Cal.Jur. 798.) 
[2] There is abundant testimony to support the trial 
court's determination that it is to the best interests of the 
children to remain with Neilma. Witnesses testified that the 
children were mentally and physically healthy, that the re-
lationship between Neilma and the children was one of love 
and companionship, and that they received proper care and 
attention. Val1ejo introduced considerable testimony to the 
effect that Neilma was not taking proper care of the chil-
dren. The trial court did not accept· Vallejo's version of 
the facts and resolved conflicts in the evidenee in favor of 
NeHma. (Foster v. Foster, supra; Busk v. Busk, 81 Cal. 
App.2d 695, 699 [185 P.2d 38].) 
Vallejo also contends that the trial court erred in several 
rulings regarding admission and rejection of evidence. 
[3] The parties stipulated that the trial judge could pri-
vately interview the children in chambers. Afterwards the 
judge stated for the record that the children appeared equally 
devoted to both parents. He stated that the boys informed 
him that they preferred living in the country to living in 
the city, but did not express any preference for one parent 
over the other. Neilma lives in the country and Vallejo lives 
in the city. Apparently fearing that the court might give 
undue weight to the children's preference for the country, 
) 
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Vallejo requested the court to ask the children "in open 
court if necessary" which parent they preferred. The re-
quest was dt'nied. No error appears in this ruling. The 
court pointed out that little weight would be given to the 
children '8 preference, since they did not appear to him to 
be of sufficirnt age to form an intelligent preference for one 
parent over the other. (Civ. Code, § 138(1)). The ques-
tion proposed by Vallejo would thus have had little if any 
probative value and would have served only to subject the 
children to serious emotional disturbance. 
Vallejo contends that the trial court improperly rejected 
his offer to prove that during the marriage Neilma had slapped 
the children and had stated that she did not want the re- I 
sponsibility of caring for them. Some of the evidence offered . 
had been presented at the 1949 trial of the divorce action; 
the remainder had not on the advice of Vallejo's attorney. 
At that trial the court rejected Vallejo's attack on Neilma's 
character and found that she was "a fit and proper person 
to have the joint legal custody, care and physical custody 
of said minor children." No appeal was taken from the 
1949 judgment. 
[4] In divorce actions the trial court has continuing juris-
diction to modify the custody provisions of the divorce de-
cree. (Civ. Code, § 138.) "But this does not mean the 
parties to such litigation may after a court has once heard 
evidence upon the subject of their fitness and ruled upon 
the question, immediately again invoke the powers of the 
court to have it inquire into the same or other facts existing 
at the time of or prior to the former decree. Such holding 
would lay a foundation for interminable and vexatious litiga-
tion. The rule is stated to be that to justify a modification 
there must be a change of circumstances arising after the 
original decree is entered, or at least a showing that the facts 
were unknown to the party urging them at the time of the 
prior order, and could not with due diligence have been ascer-
tained." (Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719, 727 [68 P.2d 719], 
quoting from Olson v. Olson, 95 Cal.App. 594, 597 [272 P. 
1113] ; accord: Munson v. Munson, 27 Ca1.2d 659, 666-667 
[166 P.2d 268] ; Prouty v. Prouty, 16 Ca1.2d 190, 193 [l05 
P.2d 295].) [5] In determining whether circumstances have 
changed, however, the court necessarily considerEl the facts 
established in the former proceeding as a basis for comparison. 
(Crater v. Crater, 135 Cal. 633, 634 [67 P. 1049] ; Simmons 
v. Simmons, 22 Cal.App. 448, 452 [134 P. 791].) [6] In 
) 
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the present case, the trial judge had presided at the former 
trial and was therefore familiar with the circumstances then 
existing. The findings of fact and conclusions of law at the 
former trial were introduced in evidence. The evidence of 
Neilma's conduct preceding entry of the interlocutory decree 
was therefore properly rejected as nonresponsive to the issues 
in the modification proceeding. (See Smith v. Smith, 85 Cal. 
App.2d 428, 433 [193 P.2d 56] ; Valentine v. Valentine, 47 
Cal.App.2d 438, 440 [118 P.2d 17]; cases collected in 9 
A.L.R.2d 623.) 
Vallejo next contends that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in modifying the divorce decree so that the chil-
dren could live with him only during parts of Christmas 
holidays and school vacations and he could visit them only 
on Sundays "from breakfast time to bed time." 
[7] The evidence supports the modification. Vallejo him-
self testified that the children were emotionally disturbed by 
being shifted from one home to the other on weekends. Neilma 
testified that the children were disrespectful to her after 
visiting Vallejo. Neilma also stated that when she disciplined 
the children they would say "I '11 tell my father on you." 
Vallejo states in his brief that a divided custody arrange-
ment is unworkable and urges this court to award him un-
divided custody to end the "pulling and tugging by the 
parents. " The same reasoning would apply on behalf of 
NeUma. Some experts believe that divided custody is harm-
ful to the welfare of children (Plant, The Psychiatrist Views 
Children of Divorced Parents, 10 Law and Contemp. Prob. 
807, 816) although others believe that barring exceptional 
circumstances, children should continue their relations with 
both parents. (Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 
10 Law and Contemp. Prob. 721, 728.) In each case, the 
trial judge must determine what is in the best interests of 
the children. The trial court in the present case could reason-
ably conclude from the evidence that a modification of the 
custody arrangements was advisable. (See Cornwall v. Corn-
wall, 108 Cal.App.2d 95, 108 [238 P.2d 8].) 
Vallejo contends that the trial judge was guilty of 
bias and prejudice, an issue raised for the first time on ap-
peal. Much of his argument is directed at matters not in 
the rccord. Thus he alleges that "the trial judge ignored 
appellant's witnesses on the first day and from then on . . . 
he looked away from them and at the opposite wall all dur-
ing their testimony, except when he occasionally tried to 
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elicit from them something adverse to Vallejo." Again, he 
asserts that "the trial judge, in his chambers, ridiculed all 
of counsel's arguments as to the relevancy of the evidence 
to be produced by Vallejo's witnesses and revealed a preju-
dicial attitude against Vallejo." No affidavits were filed to 
support the statements in the brief. (Cf. Webber v. Webber, 
33 Cal.2d 153, 164 [199 P.2d 934] [affidavits unnecessary 
when misconduct of judge appears on face of record].) 
[8] Statements of counsel in briefs are not part of the 
record on appeal. (See Ware v. Security-F'irst Nat. Bank, 
7 Ca1.2d. 604, 608 [61 P.2d 936] ; Lady v_ Barrett, 43 Cal. 
App.2d 685, 687 [111 P.2d 702].) The question whether 
the trial court was biased must therefore be determined 
from matters appearing in the reporter's transcript. 
[9] Vallejo relies on the trial court's refusal to admit 
in evidence his memorandum opinion in the 1949 trial, al-
legedly "directly and unequivocally contrary to his whole 
attitude in the 1951 proceedings." The court, however, ad-
mitted the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the 
1949 action. It acted properly in refusing to admit the 
memorandum opinion, since the findings superseded it. (See 
Belger v. Sanchez, 137 Cal. 614, 618 [70 P. 738]; Williams 
v. Kinsey, 74 Cal.App.2d 583, 600-601 [169 P.2d 487].) 
[10] Vallejo states that the trial court refused to allow him 
to ask a witness whether Vallejo had a good influence on 
the children and declared, when Vallejo nevertheless attempted 
to ask the question, "I am running the court and you are 
going to mind the judge." Since NeHma had conceded that 
Vallejo's relation with the children was one of love and 
devotion, the court's ruling was correct. Its remark was 
justified by counsel's attitude towards the court. The court 
also properly stated, "Let's not have any repetition or cumu-
lative evidence of the type we have had for the past twenty-
four hours." There was no need to waste time hearing 
testimony on facts conceded by the other party. 
[11] The other charges of prejudice involve only ad-
verse rulings or attempts by the trial judge to direct the 
course of the trial. There is no evidence of misconduct. A 
trial judge is not a mere passive spectator at the trial. 
"Within reasonable limits, it is not only the right but the 
duty of a trial judge to clearly bring out the facts so that 
the important functions of his office may be fairly and justly 
performed." (Estate of Dupont, 60 Cal.App.2d 276, 290 
[140 P.2d 866], and cases cited therein.) 
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Vallejo suggests that the trial judge's "own domestic 
difficulties affected or confused his thinking on the subject" 
and alleges that the trial judge was divorced in 1950. There 
is nothing in the record to indicate that the personal life of 
the trial judge led him to be biased against Vallejo. 
In view of the attack on the trial judge, we think it 
should be said that the record demonstrates that he impar-
tially controlled the course of the trial. In cases relied upon 
by Vallejo, such as Webber v. Webber, 33 Cal.2d 153 [199 
P.2d 934], the trial judge had exhibited bias and prej-
udice throughout the trial of the issues. In the present case 
nothing more is shown than that the trial judge refused to 
allow Vallejo to develop immaterial matters and that the 
judge did not believe Vallejo's evidence and accepted that 
of N eilma and her witnesses. 
Australian Vacation Order 
In a proceeding consolidated for trial with the modifica-
tion proceeding Neilma sought permission from the trial court 
to take the children to Australia for a temporary vacation 
trip to visit her relatives. Court permission was necessary 
because the divorce decree contained a provision restraining 
both parents from taking the children from the state. Neilma 
offered evidence to support her motion and Vallejo vigor-
ously opposed it. Before deciding the matter, however, the 
trial court denied Vallejo's application for modification of 
the divorce decree, and he immediately perfected the present 
appeal. Since the appeal deprived the trial court of juris-
diction to pass on the vacation order, a matter necessarily 
embraced within the appeal (Lerner v. Superior Court, 38 
Cal.2d 676, 681 [242 P.2d 321]), we issued prohibition to 
preclude the trial court's entering the Australian order dur-
ing the pendency of the appeal. (Gantner v. Superior Court, 
38 Ca1.2d 688 [242 P.2d 328].) We also denied Neilma's 
application to this court for a similar order. (Gantner v. 
Gantner, 38 Cal.2d 691 [242 P.2d 329].) 
The trial court has therefore never entered an order on 
the Australian vacation issue. In denying modification of 
the custody provisions of the final decree, however, it stated 
that it would be in the best interests of the children to travel 
with their mother to Australia, that the filing of a cash bond 
by the mother would be sufficient assurance that the removal 
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ing the removal wh('nev('r the appellate court permitted an 
order to be made. 
Since the writ of prohibition in Gantner v. Superior Court, 
supra, was issued for the pendency of the appeal only, our 
affirmance here will remove the jurisdictional barrier and 
allow the trial court, in its discretion, to enter an order allow-
ing Neilma to take the children to Australia. Both Neilma 
and Vallejo have requested this court to issue an advisory 
ruling to the trial court informing it whether it may enter 
the Australian order, even though there is no appeal before 
us on this issue and no findings of fact or order to review. 
[12] Vallejo contends that this court "must as a mat-
ter of law ... give a clear mandate to the trial court and 
to Neilma that under no circumstances are the children to 
be taken to Australia, this year or in any other. year, until 
they desire to do so of their own free will and choice." 
Insofar as this contention is based on the theory that the 
trial court (in the absence of the pendency of an appeal) 
lacks jurisdiction to allow Neilma to take the children from 
the state, it is without merit. If the trial court concludes 
that the best interests of the children would be promoted by 
removal to Australia, either permanently or temporarily, and 
its decision is supported by sufficient evidence, removal would 
be proper. (Clarke v. Clarke, 35 Ca1.2d 259, 262 [217 P.2d 
401]; Shea v. Shea, 100 Cal.App.2d 60, 63 [223 P.2d 32] ; 
White v. White, 68 Cal.App.2d 650, 652 [157 P.2d 415] ; 
Edwards v. Edwards, 191 Ore. 275, 280 [227 P.2d 975]; 
see cases collected in 154 A.L.R. 552.) Vallejo points out 
that if Neilma is permitted to take the children to Australia, 
the courts of that country would have jurisdiction to enter 
a new custody award. (See Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 
Cal.2d 763, 779 [197 P.2d 739] ; In re B's Settlement, 1 Ch. 
54 [1940].) He thus presents an argument that the trial 
court must consider in passing on the vacation matter; but 
does not show that the trial court could not under any cir-
cumstances allow the trip to be made. Vallejo also notes that 
the 1949 divorce decree restrained Neilma from taking the 
children from the state. The trial court, however, has con-
tinuing jurisdiction to modify custody provisions of divorce 
decrees. (Civ. Code, § 138.) 
Neilma has requested this court to enter its order in such 
form as to permit the children to visit Australia "so that 
the further function of the trial court herein shall be and 
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cited to authorize the requested order is section 956a of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, providing that appellate courts may 
take « additional evidence of or concerning facts occurring 
at any time prior to the decision of the appeal and may 
give or direct the entry of any judgment or order and 
make such further or other order as the case may require." 
[13] The purpose of section 956a is to permit an appellate 
court to remedy defects in the record "to the end that the 
judgment or order appealed from may be affirmed and fur-
ther litigation terminated, and where otherwise under the old 
practice the judgment or order would have to be reversed." 
(Tupman v. Haberkern, 208 Cal. 256, 266 [280 P. 970] j see 
also Johndrow v. Thomas, 31 Ca1.2d 202,207 [187 P.2d 681].) I 
[14] But in asking this court to order the trial court to . 
enter the Australian vacation order, Neilma is in effect seek-
ing to obtain an order from this court modifying the final 
divorce decree, a question never decided by the trial court. 
There are no findings of fact on that issue. As pointed out 
in the Tupman case, section 956a "was not intended to con-
vert the appellate tribunals of the state into triers of fact." 
(208 Cal. at pp. 269-270.) The motion to enter a special 
order under section 956a cannot be granted. 
Neilma argues that Vallejo will "foment other and further 
vexatious litigation for the purpose of unduly delaying the I 
visit of the minor children to Australia." Her argument in-
dicates a misconception of the scope of the decision in Gant-
ner v. Superior Oourt, S'ltpra. We there held that during the 
pendency of the appeal the trial court was deprived of juris-
diction to enter an order allowing the children to leave the 
state. (Code Civ. Proc. § 946.) Nothing in that decision 
deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to enter the Australian 
vacation order merely because VaUejo may inaugurate new 
attempts in the trial court to modify the custody decree. The 
situation presented in Gantner v. Superior Oourt will recur 
only if the trial court should pass on any such motion for 
modification before it passes on the Australian order, so that 
VaUejo would be enabled to perfect an appeal and remove 
the cause from the jurisdiction of the trial court. 
When the writ of prohibition is discharged following ter-
mination of this appeal, the court may decide the vacation 
issue on the basis of the evidence previously presented and 
such additional evidence as may be presented by the parties 
regarding facts arising after issuance of the writ of pro-
hibition, or facts that were unknown to the parties' at the 
:) 
) 
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former proceeding and that could not have been ascertained 
with due diligence. [15] Since the trial on the vacation 
issue has nev('r been completed, but only suspended by the 
appeal from the order denying modification of the divorce 
dl'cree, nse of the evidcnce at the 1951 hearing does not come 
within thc rule that evidence at a former trial is usually 
inadmissible at a second trial. (See Blache v. Blache, 37 
Ca1.2d 531, 534-536 [233 P.2d 547].) 
[16] Neilma has filed a motion requesting this court to 
take additional evidence under section 956a to support an 
affirmance of the order denying modification of the final de-
cree. Since there is sufficient evidence in the record to sup-
port the findings and the order below, no purpose would 
be served by granting the motion and it will therefore be 
denied. 
The order denying the motion to change custody is af-
firmed. The motions to make a special order and to take 
additional evidence under section 956a are denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
